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Abstract
I investigate the equilibrium properties of a deterministic voting model in which
the policy space is multidimensional and politicians have limited ability to com-
mit to platforms. This analysis is useful to answer Political Economy questions
in which the multidimensional nature of the policy is crucial to model voters’
trade-offs. The use of unidimensional models to study such problems is preva-
lent in the literature. This usually implies that one or more policy dimensions
are assumed to be exogenous. This choice delivers sharp theoretical predic-
tions, but implies an oversimplification of the problem, which often results in
implausible or empirically inconsistent predictions.
I show that under suitable restrictions on the individuals’ capability of com-
mitting to policy platforms and on individual preferences a Median Voter Theo-
rem holds even if the policy space is multidimensional. Moreover, I show that the
comparative statics of the equilibrium policy outcome induced by a change in the
voters’ distribution is monotone. I use this tool to extend the Meltzer-Richard
model about size of the government. I show this model delivers empirically con-
sistent predictions if a sufficiently rich policy space is assumed. Finally, I show
that this framework can be used to study other Political Economy problems
beyond simple voting problems.
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1. Introduction
The model of electoral competition proposed by Downs (1957) is a sim-
ple and useful tool that has proved to be extremely successful in the Political
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2Economy literature. The model delivers very strong predictions: under suitable
assumptions the Median Voter Theorem states that the unique equilibrium is
the policy that is most preferred by the median voter, which implies that the
levels and the comparative statics of the political equilibrium reduces to the
ones of a single pivotal individual. The ease of calculation and interpretation of
this prediction had to face a general lack of empirical support. A famous exam-
ple is given by an influential paper by Meltzer and Richard (1981), who have
shown that in a simple general equilibrium economy the size of the governmen-
tal expenditures is monotonic increasing in the mean to median income ratio.
The large body of empirical studies2 that has followed their paper has provided
very little support to this hypotesis, with a majority of these analyses showing
no statistically significant relationship between the two variables of interest and
a number of papers that found a significant relationship but with opposite sign
in comparison with the one implied by the Metlzer and Richard result.
A possible explanation for this poor performance of the model is a direct
consequence of the restrictive assumptions that one has to impose in order
to achieve the existence of a Majority Voting equilibrium in Downsian model,
and one in particular is relevant for this and for several other examples: the
unidimensionality of the policy space. In Melzer and Richard’s paper a crucial
consequence of this restriction is that the policy space is made of two variables:
a linear tax rate and a lump-sum grant, that are connected by a balanced
governmental budget constraint such that the effective choice of voters is reduced
to a unidimensional policy space. The oversimplification of this setting is evident
in several aspects. For instance in most countries direct redistribution is just one
component of governmental spending and does not usually represent the largest
share, given that usually expenditures in direct provision of Public Goods and
services and other welfare policies accounts for a larger share of the public
budget. Moreover the choice of a very simple tax system is likely to influence
the result.
Unfortunately the attempt to model the political interaction in a Downsian
model when the policy space is multidimensional has to face extremely restric-
tive assumptions in order to achieve existence of a pure strategy equilibrium
(see section 2). Following a successful stream of literature (Levy 2004, 2005,
Roemer 1999, etc.) my approach is to make the political interaction slightly
more complex (and realistic) in comparison with the one implied in Downsian
models by introducing coalitions (or factions) as intermediate bodies between
the voters and the policies that have to be implemented.
The crucial idea of this approach is that individual citizens have limited
ability to commit to specific policies, but they are allowed to form coalitions
whose role is to increase the space of policies that a faction can credibily commit
to implement after elections, namely a coalition can propose any policy in the
Pareto set of its members. This assumption is common in the recent Political
Economy literature (see Levy 2004, 2005, Roemer 1999).
2For a review of the literature about this topic see de Mello, Tiongson 2006.
3In this paper I do not explicitly model the process of coalition formation,
but I require coalitions to be stable in a peculiar and relatively weak way: a
coalition A is stable if there is at least a vector of policies x in its Pareto set
such that there is no other vector of policies x′ with the following features: (i)
x′ makes each member of a subcoalition A′ ⊂ A strictly better off with respect
to x; (ii) x′ is in the Pareto set of the subcoalition A′; (iii) there is no policy
x′′ in the Pareto set of the complementary subcoalition A\A′ that is preferred
to x′ by the society as a whole according to some social preference relation
(that is going to be Majority Voting). The details of this concept of stability
will be given in section 2, but this description is sufficient to understand how
flexible this concept of stability is: it is very unlikely that a coalition can be
stable if for any policy that this coalition can put forward a subcoalition can
deviate and propose a policy that makes all its member strictly better off (i),
that is feasible for the deviators (ii), and such that the remaining members of
the original coalition do not have access to any alternative that represents a
“credible threat” and that can discourage this deviation (iii).
In this paper I show that under this notion of stability and some specific as-
sumptions on individual preferences a Median Voter Theorem and a monotone
comparative statics of the equilibrium outcomes can be derived in a multidimen-
sional policy space. This result may be used to shed light on the effect of the
restriction of unidimensionality of the policy space in some common applications
in the literature.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the existing lit-
erature about models of Political Economy in a multidimensional policy space
and highlights why none of the existing models is suitable to analyze sufficiently
complex problems of comparative statics. In section 3 I describe the model of
political interaction and the notion of stability that I will use in the rest of the
paper and the restriction on individual preferences that I need to impose. In
section 4 I present the two main results of this paper: the Generalized Median
Voter Theorem and the Monotone Comparative statics of the equilibrium out-
come; moreover I show how my findings can be interpreted as a generalization
of some results in the literature, I also describe some features of the coalition
structures that can emerge in equilibrium and of the Social Choice that is im-
plied by this model. Section 5 introduces a generalization of the model in which
a more complex game is played such that agents do not only vote over different
policy vectors but they also have access to a richer strategy space. I show that
when the resulting game has some specific characteristics (similar to the ones of
a game with strategic complementarities) a monotone comparative statics result
similar to the one in section 4 can be derived. Section 6 describes two possible
applications: the first one shows how the result in Meltzer and Richard’s paper
is not robust to a small change in the environment and that in a rather simple
but more realistic setting their monotonicity result cannot be achieved or if it
is it has the opposite direction in comparison with the one they derive in their
simpler setting. This result may help to shed light on the reasons that underpin
the lack of empirical support to the main prediction of their model. The second
one is an application of the extension in section 5 and it shows that interesting
4prediction can be derived if a famous game, namely the Arms Race, is played in
a Political Economy framework. Sections 6 concludes providing some comments
about the importance and the limits of the results in the paper.
2. Literature
The seminal contributions of Hotelling (1929) , Black (1948) and Downs
(1957) gave rise to the success in the Political Economy literature of the so-
called Downsian models of political competition, which proved to be extremely
successful and it is still popular in recent applications. The reason of this success
relies in the simple and powerful result that this model delivers under suitable
restrictions on individual preferences: the Median Voter Theorem. The crucial
consequence of this result is that the equilibrium choice is going to be the policy
that is most preferred by a single individual (Pivotal voter or Condorcet winner),
which is the median individual. This implies in turn that all predictions about
levels and comparative statics of the equilibrium outcomes are very easy to
derive and to interpret in relations to the changes of the identity and preferences
of the pivotal individual.
Unfortunately it is well known that the conditions for the existence of a
Condorcet winner in a multidimensional policy space are extremely burdensome
(see Plott 1967; Davis, DeGroot, Hinich 1972; and Grandmont, 1978). This
implies that in order to study problems that are characterized by a sufficiently
rich policy space one has to rely to an alternative model of political interaction.
In the Political Economy literature there are several examples of models that
meet this requirement; in this section I will mention the most popular ones and
explain why none of them is suitable to answer questions about the compar-
ative statics of the equilibrium outcomes if the number of available policies is
sufficiently large.
The first and popular example is given by Citizen-Candidate models first
proposed by Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997); this
class of models is based on the assumption each voter can run for elections but
she cannot commit to any policy that is not in her set of ideal points. Under
this (rather restrictive) assumption the existence of a political equilibrium is
ensured, but multiplicity of equilibria3 is a typical outcome. For instance with
the same set of voters there may be equilibria with only one candidate running
unopposed, equilibria with two candidates or more, and each of these cases is
characterized by a different set of policies that are implemented in equilibrium.
This implies that the model is not suitable to answer questions about policy
outcomes and their comparative statics because the set of policy vectors that
can be equilibria is usually too large to deliver any useful prediction. The
3There is a particular case, highlighted in Besley and Coate (1997) in which the Citizen
Candidate model delivers an equilibium that exhibits features that are very similar to the
ones of the equilibrium concept described in this paper. In section 4.3 I describe this case and
show that it can be interpreted as a particular case of my more general setting.
5problem of multiplicity is shared with the Party Unanimity Nash Equilibrium
(PUNE) proposed by Roemer (1999).
The model developed by Levy (2004, 2005) is based on the idea that cit-
izens can expand their ability to commit to policies different from their own
ideal point by forming coalitions such that each coalition can propose any pol-
icy that is in the Pareto set of its members. A peculiar notion of coalition
stability ensures existence of an equilibrium in a multimensional policy space
even if the individual preferences are relatively complex (i.e. individuals differ
in two paramenters that enter their utility function). On the other hand the
predictions about levels and comparative statics of the equilibrium outcomes
can be derived analytically only for problems in which the policy space or the
individual preferences are restricted in such a way that a very small number of
policy vectors can be chosen in an equilibrium. for instance in the application
described in Levy (2005) there are only three policies that can be be chosen in
any equilibrium). This make Levy’s model unsuitable to analyze more complex
problems.
Finally we have a relative large literature about Probabilistic Voting Models
(Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Enelow and Hinich, 1989) that under not very
restrictive assumptions ensure the existence and uniqueness of a voting equi-
librium. These models do not deliver any result that makes the political equi-
librium equivalent to the ideal point of a single “pivotal individual”, therefore
the kind of comparative statics that can emerge is generally more complex to
derive and its interpretation is not always straightforward. Given that the equi-
libium outcomes of Probabilistic Models depend in principle on the preferences
of all voters, then all comparative statics exercises have to be related to some
charasteristic of the whole population, for instance a feature of its distribution
that can be summarized by a unidimensional parameter. An example of this
approach is in a paper by Dotti (2014) in which in a model of public provision
of a private good the comparative statics of the equilibrium outcome induced
by a marginal mean preserving spread in the income distribution of voters is
derived.
In order to deal with more general comparative statics questions it is nec-
essary to apply a tool that allows to summarizes the preferences of the society
into the choice of a single individual, such that the comparative statics induced
by changes in the environment can be derived and interpreted easily and condi-
tion for its monotonicity can be imposed in a simple and intuitive way. These
features, that are ensured by the Median Voter Theorem in the unidimensional
case, can be achieved in a multidimensional policy space thanks to the model
presented in this paper.
3. The Model
3.1. Setting
Consider a voting game with n voters (n odd) such that each voter i ∈ N is
denoted by a vector of parameters θi ∈ Θ. Assume (Θ,4) is a totally ordered
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set for some transitive, reflexive, antisymmetric order relation 4. This allows
me to establish a total order in the set of players N , such that for all i, j ∈ N
we have i ≤ j if and only if θi 4 θj . For instance suppose θ is individual income,
then θ ∈ [θ, θ] and Θ is a totally ordered set under the order relation ≤.
Each individual i ∈ N is endowed with a reflexive, complete and transitive
preference ordering i that can be represented by a continuous and θ− concave
utility function4 F : X ×Θ→ R.
The policy space X is a subset of the the d-dimensional real space Rd. In
order to characterize X it is useful to recall some definitions.
Let (L,6) be a partially ordered set, with the transitive, reflexive, antisym-
metric order relation 6. For x and y elements of X, let x ∨ y denote the least
upper bound, or join, of x and y in X, if it exists, and let x ∧ y denote the
greatest lower bound, or meet of x and y in X, if it exists. The set L is a lattice
if for every pair of elements x and y in L, the join x∨ y and meet x∧ y do exist
as elements of L. Similarly, a subset X of L is a sublattice of L if X is closed
under the operations meet and join. A sublattice X of a lattice L is a convex
sublattice of L, if x 6 z 6 y and x, y in X implies that z belongs to X, for
all elements x, y, z in L. Finally, a sublattice X of S is complete if for every
nonempty subset X ′ of X, inf(X ′) and sup(X ′) both exist and are elements of
X.
Recall the d-dimensional real space Rd is a partially ordered set under the
transitive, reflexive, antisymmetric order relation ≤5. Moreover Rd is a lattice
given the definition above. Now we have all the elements to characterize the
policy space X. Let X ⊆ Rd be a convex sublattice of Rd, then (X,≤) is a
partially orderet set with order relation ≤. An example of a policy space that
satisfies my assumption is given by the family of sets Y = {y|y ∈ [a, b]d} where
a, b ∈ Rd.
Subset of voters can form coalitions A ⊆ N . The role of coalitions in this
model is to increase the effective policy space available to the voters. Define
pX,A(a) ≡ {b ∈ X : b i a ∀i ∈ A, b i a ∀i ∈ A} to be the set of allocation
in X that are Pareto superior to a for coalition A. We assume that a coalition
can propose any policy in the Pareto set of its members, i.e. xA ∈ P(A) where
P(A) ≡ {a ∈ X : pX,A(a) = }. If a coalition is a singleton then the Pareto set
reduces to the set of ideal points of its unique member (as in a citizen-candidate
model).
3.2. Stability
In order to define a stability in this model we need to characterize a coalition
structure and the preferences of each coalition. A coalition stucture is defined
4For any function f defined on the convex subset X of Rd , we say that f is concave in
direction v 6= 0 if, for all x, the map from the scalar s to f(x + sv) is concave. (The domain
of this map is taken to be the largest interval such that x + sv lies in X.) We say that f is
i− concave if it is concave in direction v for any v > 0 with vi = 0. See Quah (2007).
5For x, y ∈ Rd x ≤ y if and only if xi ≤ yi for all i = 1, 2, ..., d.
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as a partition P of N , i.e. a set of subsets of N such that  /∈ P, ∪A∈PA = N
and if A,B ∈ P with A 6= B, then A ∩ B = .
We define a complete social preference relation  and  such that  is
irreflexive i.e. x  x and  is reflexive i.e. x  x and the weak and strong
relations are dual, i.e. a  b ⇔ ¬b  a ( is not necessarily transitive). Given
this preference relation we can define PA(a) ≡ {b ∈ A : b  a} where A ⊆ X to
be the strictly preferred set of a in A and K(A) ≡ {a ∈ A : PA(a) = } to be
the set of P −maximal alternatives in A, or the Core.
The crucial aspect of my concept of stability relies on the idea of “credible
threat”.
I define SA(a) ≡ {b ∈ P(A′),A′ ⊆ A : b i a ∀i ∈ A′, b  c ∀c ∈ P(A\A′)}
to be the set of “credible threats” to a. SA(a) corresponds to the set of policies
that are strictly preferred to a by each member of any subcoalition A′ ⊆ A
and that are preferred by the society to any policy that can be proposed by the
residual coalition A\A′.
Using this concept we can define the S-Core (SK) to be the set of S −
maximal alternatives in A. i.e. SK(A) = {a ∈ P(A) : SA(a) = } is the set
of policies that do not face any “credible threat” from any subcoalition of A.
With this structure we can now define a concept of stability for a coalition
structure in this game:
Definition 1. A coalition A is stable if and only if SK(A) is nonempty.
It is useful to give an example of why a coalition that does not satisfy the
definition above is unlikely to survive. Suppose SK(A) = . Then for any
a ∈ P(A), ∃b ∈ P(A′) and A′ ⊆ A such that b i a ∀i ∈ A′ and b  c ∀c ∈
P(A\A′), i.e. there exists a subset of the coalition A and a policy b ∈ P(A′)
such that b is strictly preferred to a by all members of the subcoalition A′ and
b is also preferred by the society as a whole to any policy c that the remaining
part of the original coalition A\A′ can propose.
It is natural to consider this coalition structure unstable because for any
policy chosen by this coalition in its Pareto Set (e.g. through some form of
bargaining), the choice of this policy would not be self-enforcing because a
subcoalition A′ can deviate and propose a different policy that makes each
member of the subcoalition strictly better off, that is preferred by the society as
a whole, and such that the remaining part of the original coalition A\A′ cannot
prevent this deviation because there is no feasible “punishment” policy that can
represent a credible threat for the deviators.
Definition 2. A stable coalition structure is a partition P of N such that all
the coalitions Aj ∈ P are stable.
3.3. Preferences
In order to establish our result I need to restrict individual and social prefer-
ences. The kind of restrictions I am going to use are very common in the many
fields of Economic Theory.
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About individual preferences the assumptions are Supermodularity (SM) and
Strict Single Crossing Property (SSCP).
Recall that individual preferences can be represented by a function F : X ×
Θ→ R. A function F satisfies:
(i) SM if and only if F (a∨ b, θ)−F (a, θ) ≥ F (b, θ)−F (a∧ b, θ) for all θ ∈ Θ
and for all a, b ∈ X.
(ii) SSCP in (a, θ) if and only if F (a, θ)− F (b, θ) > F (a, θ)− F (b, θ) for all
a ≥ b and a 6= b, and for all θ, θ ∈ Θ such that θ > θ.
Given the individual preferences described above, I define M(i) to be set of
ideal points of an individual i, i.e. M(i) ≡ {y|y ∈ arg maxx∈X F (x, θi)}6.
About social preferences I am assuming Majority Voting, which is the most
common and widely used criterion in order to establish a social preference re-
lation. Formally a  b if and only if ∑ni=1 1[F (a, θi) ≥ F (b, θi)] > n/2. Notice
that this preference relation does not necessarily imply a tournament, i.e. it is
possible that a 6= b and a ∼ b.
3.4. Equilibrium
Now that the setting is complete we need to define an equilibrium for this
voting game.
Definition 3. A policy vector a ∈ A is a winning policy if and only if it is in
the strong Core of A, i.e. a ∈ K(A).
Given that our Social preference relation is Majority Voting this is equivalent
to say that a is a Condorcet Winner7 of the set of alternatives A.
Suppose a coalition structure is made of h coalitions Aj for j = 1, 2, ..., h.
then we can define an equilibrium for the voting game as follows.
Definition 4. A pure strategy equilibrium is a coalition structure P∗ = {Aj}hj=1,
a policy profile A∗ = {aj}hj=1 and a set of winning policies W (A∗) ⊆ A∗ such
that:
(i) P∗ is a stable coalition structure;
(ii)aj ∈ SK(Aj) for all j = 1, 2, .., h;
(iii) W (A∗) is nonempty.
In other words in an equilibrium each coalition is stable and is represented
by one of the policy vectors that makes it stable, and the winning policy is a
Condorcet Winner of the reduced games in which the policy space ir reduced to
A∗ ⊆ X.
6Notice that the completeness of X implies compactness in the order-interval topology.
On bounded sets in Rd, the order-interval topology coincides with the Eucilidean topology
(Birkhoff 1967). Hence M(i) 6=  for all i ∈ N .
7The relationship between the concepts of strong Core and Condorcet winner is described
in Ordershook, 1986, pp. 347-349.
94. Results
The main result of this paper is stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 5. (Median Voter Theorem). (i) An equilibrium of the voting game
exists. (ii) In any equilibrium the set of winning policies W is a subset of the
set of ideal points of the median voter m, i.e. W ⊆ M(m). (iii) If the median
voter has a unique ideal point, this policy is going to be the one chosen in any
equilibrium.
In order to prove this result we need to introduce some additional notation.
Suppose the coalition A has k members. Consider a set of k×1 weighting vectors
ΛA ≡ {λ : ∑i∈A λi = 1} for each coalitionA and a function G : X×ΛA×Θ→ R
defined as follows: G(x, λ,Θ) =
∑
i∈A λiF (x, θi).
Lemma 6. If F is a continuous function of x and X is a convex set then any
point a in the Pareto set of A is a solution to maxx∈X G(x, λa,Θ) for some
vector λa ∈ ΛA.
Proof. M.W.G., Proposition 16.E.2.
We need to define four additional objects:
(i) a vectorλA,j such that λA,ji = λi∀i ∈ A : θi < θj , λA,ji = 0 ∀i ∈ A : θi >
θj , λ
A,j
j =
∑
i ∈ A
i ≥ j
λi;
(ii) a vector λ¯A,j such that λ¯A,ji = λi∀i ∈ A : θi > θm, λ¯A,ji = 0 ∀i ∈ A :
θi < θj , λ¯
A,j
j =
∑
i ∈ A
i ≥ j
λi;
(iii) the set ΛA,j = {λA,j , λA, λ¯A,j};
(iv) an order relation ≤λgiven by: λ1 ≤λ λ2 iff λ1i ≥ λ2i ∀i ≤ m and λ1i ≤ λ2i
∀i ≥ m. It follows that (ΛA,j ,≤λ) is a totally ordered set.
Lemma 7. If F satisfies SM and SSCP then the Pareto Set P(A) of a coalition
of players A ⊆ N is such that x ∈ P(A) only if x ≥ sup {M(l)} and x ≤
inf {M(h)} where l = inf(A) and h = sup(A) .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 8. The function G(x, λ,Θ) satisfies (i) SM in x and (ii) SCP in (x, λ)
∀λ ∈ ΛA,j.
Proof. (i) SM. G is the sum of SM functions so it is supermodular (proof in
Milgrom, Shannon, 1994). (ii) SCP. Using the definition of supermodularity,
G is supermodular if and only if: G(x¯, λA,Θ)−G(x, λA,Θ) ≥ G(x¯, , λa,j ,Θ)−
G(x, λa,j ,Θ) ∀x ≥ x, λ ∈ ~Λa,j . Use the definitions of G and λa,j :
[G(x¯, λA,Θ)−G(x, λA,Θ)]− [G(x¯, λA,j ,Θ)−G(x, λA,j ,Θ)] =
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= (
∑
i ∈ A
i ≥ j
λi[F (x¯, θi)− F (x, θi)])− (
∑
i ∈ A
i ≥ j
λi)[F (x¯, θj)− F (x, θj)] =
=
∑
i ∈ A
i ≥ j
λi ([F (x¯, θi)− F (x, θi)]− [F (x¯, θj)− F (x, θj)])
Notice that [F (x¯, θi) − F (x, θi)] − [F (x¯, θj) − F (x, θj)] ≥ 0 ∀i ≥ j and λi ≥ 0
∀i hence the sum above is also weakly positive, which implies [G(x¯, λA,Θ) −
G(x, λA,Θ)]− [G(x¯, λA,j ,Θ)−G(x, λA,j ,Θ)] ≥ 0. Similarly one can show that
this is also true for (λA, λ¯A,j)and (λA,j , λ¯A,j). Finally notice that given that X
is a convex sublattice of Rd and x ≤ x˜ ≤ x¯, then x˜ ∈ X.
Lemma 9. If x ∈ P(A) then ∃x′ ∈ P(A≤j) with A≤j = {i ∈ A : i ≤ j} such
that x′ ≤ x.
Proof. Milgrom-Shannon’s monotone comparative statics implies: M˜(A, λ) =
arg maxx∈X,λ∈ΛG(x, λ,Θ) is monotone nondecreasing in λ. Hence ∃x′ ∈ M˜(A′, λA,j)
such that x′ ≤ x. Given that, together with the θ − concavity of F and the
convexity of X (which together imply a convex utility possibility set), using the
result in Mas Colell, Proposition 16.E.2, it follows that x ∈ P(Aj), i.e. x is in
the Pareto set of coalition Aj = {i ∈ A : i ≤ j}. Q.E.D.
Notice that we cannot exclude that x′ = x.
Lemma 10. If x′ ∈ M˜(A, λA,j) and x ∈ M˜(A′, λA,j) and x′ ≤ x, x′ 6= x , then
F (x′, θj) ≥ F (x, θj) and F (x′, θi) > F (x, θi) ∀i < j.
Proof. We know x′ ≤ x and G(x′, λA,j ,Θ) ≥ G(x, λA,j ,Θ) from Monotone
comparative statics. Suppose F (x′, θj) < F (x, θj). Then it must be true that∑
i∈A λ
A,j
i [F (x
′, θi)− F (x′, θi)] > F (x′, θj) − F (x, θj). Using
∑
i∈A λ
A,j
i = 1
the above can be rearranged as follows:∑
i∈A
λA,ji ([F (x
′, θi)− F (x′, θi)]− [F (x′, θj)− F (x, θj)]) > 0
. Notice that x′ ≤ x and i ≤ j ∀i ∈ A, hence SSCP implies [F (x′, θi)− F (x′, θi)]−
[F (x′, θj)− F (x, θj)] ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ A and hence∑
i∈A
λA,ji ([F (x
′, θi)− F (x′, θi)]− [F (x′, θj)− F (x, θj)]) ≤ 0
which leads to a contradiction. Hence it must be true that F (x′, θj) ≥ F (x, θj).
Given that x′ ≤ x, x′ 6= x, SSCP implies F (x′, θi) > F (x, θi) ∀i < j.
Lemma 11. The coalition Am (could be a singleton) that includes the median
voter m is stable only if am ∈M(m).
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Proof. Suppose am /∈M(m) (A1).
(i) If am ≥ xm(≤) for any xm = inf{M(m)} and am ∧ xm ∈ P(Am). A1
implies F (xm, θm) > F (a
m, θm). SSCP implies F (xm, θi) > F (a
m, θi) and
xm i am ∀i ∈ N : θi ≤ θm(≥). Recall that any c ∈ P(Am\A≤m) is c ≥
xm(because of Lemma 7). Hence either c ∈ M(m) or
∑n
i=1 1[F (xm, θi) >
F (c, θi)] > n/2 ∀c ∈ P(A\A′) which implies xm  c→ am /∈ SK(Am).
(ii) If am  xm, am  xm and am ∧ xm ∈ P(A)., Consider am ∨ xm(am ∧
xm). Revealed preferences imply F (xm, θm) ≥ F (am ∨ xm, θm). QSM implies
F (am ∧ xm, θm) ≥ F (am, θm). SSCP implies F (am ∧ xm, θi) > F (am, θi) ∀i ∈
N : θi ≤ θm. Recall that any c ∈ P(Am\A≤m) is c ≥ xm ≥ am ∧ xm. Hence
either c ∈ M(m) or ∑ni=1 1[F (am ∧ xm, θi) ≥ F (c, θi)] > n/2 which implies
am ∧ xm  c.
(iii) If and am ∧ xm /∈ P(Am). am ∧ xm. Recall that X is a convex set
and F (x, θ) is θ − concave, hence as am ∈ Am it has to be the solution to a
problem in the form am ∈ arg maxx∈X G(x, λm,Θ). Now if am ∧xm is not part
of the Pareto set of Am, consider the following alternative: x˜ ∈ M˜(A, λam,m)
(see Lemma 3). We know from Lemma 3 that x˜ ≤ am. First of all notice that
M˜(A, λam,m) = M˜(A′, λ′) for some λ′, which imples that x˜ ∈ P(A′), i.e. it
is in the Pareto set of A′. We need to show that x˜ 6= am and that x˜ i am
∀i ∈ A′. Suppose x˜ = am → am ∈ P(A′). But from point (b) we know that
F (am ∧ xm, θi) > F (am, θi)∀i ∈ N : θi ≤ θm → am /∈ P(A′) →Contraddiction.
Hence x˜ 6= am and x˜ ≤ am. Moreover, Lemma 4 implies x˜ m am. This means
that F (x˜, θm) ≥ F (am, θm) and because x˜ 6= am SSCP implies F (x˜, θi) >
F (am, θi) ∀i ∈ N : θi ≤ θm. Recall that any c ∈ P(Am\A≤m) is c ≥ xm ≥ x˜.
Hence either c ∈ M(m) or ∑ni=1 1[F (x˜, θi) ≥ F (c, θi)] > n/2 which implies
x˜  c→ am /∈ SK(Am).
Now Suppose am ∈M(m), and in particular say am = x¯m = sup{M(m)} (=
xm inf{M(m)}). Consider any coalition A≤m such that θi < θm(≥) ∀i ∈ A≤m.
From Lemma 7 we know that any b ∈ P(A≤m) it must be true that b ≤ xm(≥).
Optimality implies F (xm, θm) > F (b, θm). SSCP implies F (xm, θi) ≥ F (b, θi)
and xm i b ∀i ∈ N : θi ≥ θm(≤). Hence
∑n
i=1 1[F (xm, θi) ≥ F (b, θi)] > n/2
∀b ∈ P(A≤m) which implies xm  b ∀b ∈ P(Am)→ am ∈ SK(Am).
Finally Consider any coalition Am such that θi ≤ θm(≥) ∀i ∈ Am and
am = xm(xm). From Lemma 7 we know that any b ∈ P(Am) it must be true that
b ≤ xm(≥ xm). This implies F (xm, θm) > F (b, θm). SSCP implies F (xm, θi) >
F (b, θi) and xm i b ∀i ∈ N : θi ≥ θm(≤). Hence
∑n
i=1 1[F (xm, θi) ≥
F (b, θi)] > n/2 ∀b ∈ P(Am) which implies xm  a ∀a ∈ P(Am)→ PP(Am)(am) =
 ↔ am ∈ K(Am).
Lemma 12. Any coalition Aj that does not contain the median voter m is
stable only if ∃aj such that either of the following is true: (i) aj ∈ M(m); (ii)
aj ≥ xm for all xm ∈M(m); (iii) aj ≤ xm for all xm ∈M(m).
Proof. Suppose aj /∈ M(m) and aj  xm, aj  xm . There are three possible
cases.
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(i) say xk ∈ M(k) and ∀k ∈ Aj it is true either xk ≥ aj or xk ≤ aj .
Consider xj such that F (xj , θm) ≥ F (xk, θm). In particular consider xj =
inf{min k ∈ Aj
k > m
xk} or x¯j = sup{max k ∈ Aj
k < m
xk}. Suppose xj = xj (x¯j).
Optimality implies F (xj , θj) > F (a
j , θj). Notice that because xj 6= aj SSCP
implies F (xj , θi) > F (a
j , θi) ∀i ∈ N : θi > θm(<). Notice that both xj and x¯j
are in the Pareto set P(A<j) = P({i ∈ A : i < m}) (P(A>j) = P({i ∈ A : i >
m})) because they are the highest (lower) ideal points of some member of the
subcoalition A<j (see Lemma 7). Finally notice that any policy b ∈ P(Aj\A<j)
must be b ∈M(m) or b ≤ xj (≥) (because of Lemma 7). Hence if xj 6= aj then∑n
i=1 1[F (xj , θi) ≥ F (b, θi)] > n/2 ∀b ∈ P(Aj\A<j) which implies xj  b∀b ∈
P(Aj\A<j)→ aj /∈ SK(Aj).
(ii) ∃xk ∈ M(k), k ∈ Aj , θk > θm(<) such that xk  aj , xk  aj (A2).
Consider xk ∧ aj . Notice that (A2) implies xk ∧ aj 6= aj . Optimality implies
F (xk, θk) ≥ F (xk∨aj , θk). SM implies F (xk∧aj , θk) ≥ F (aj , θk). SSCP implies
F (xk ∧ aj , θi) ≥ F (aj , θi) ∀i ∈ N : θi ≤ θm. Hence
∑n
i=1 1[F (xk ∧ aj , θi) ≥
F (aj , θi)] > n/2. which implies xk ∧ aj  a ∀a ∈ P(Aj).
(iii) Is xk ∧ aj part of the Pareto set of A<j? Recall that X is a convex
set and F (x, θ) is θ − concave, hence as aj ∈ P(Aj) it has to be the solution
to a problem in the form aj ∈ arg maxx∈X G(x, λj ,Θ). Now if xk ∧ aj is not
part of the Pareto set of Aj , consider the following alternative: x˜ ∈ M˜(A, λaj ,k)
(see Lemma 6). We know from Lemma 9 that x˜ ≤ aj . First of all notice that
M˜(A, λaj ,k) = M˜(A′, λ′) for some λ′, which imples that x˜ ∈ P(A′), i.e. it
is in the Pareto set of A<j .We need to show that x˜ 6= aj and that x˜ i aj
∀i ∈ A<j . Suppose x˜ = aj → aj ∈ P(A<j). From point (ii) we know that
F (xk ∧ aj , θi) > F (aj , θi) ∀i ∈ N : θi ≤ θm → aj /∈ P(A<j)→ Contraddiction.
Hence x˜ 6= aj and x˜ ≤ aj . Moreover, Lemma 10 implies x˜ j aj . This means
that F (x˜, θj) ≥ F (aj , θj) and because x˜ 6= aj SSCP implies F (x˜, θi) > F (aj , θi)
∀i ∈ N : θi ≤ θj . Recall that any c ∈ P(A\A<j) is c ≥ xj ≥ x˜. Hence either
c ∈ M(m) or ∑ni=1 1[F (x˜, θi) ≥ F (c, θi)] > n/2 which implies x˜  c → aj /∈
SK(Aj).
4.1. Proof of main result (Theorem 5)
The main result of this paper is stated in the following theorem:
(i) An equilibrium exists. (ii) In any equilibrium the set of win-
ning policies W is a subset of the set of ideal points of the median
voter m, i.e. W ⊆ M(m). (iii) If the median voter has a unique
ideal point, this policy is going to be the one chosen in any equilib-
rium.
Proof. The results in Lemma 11 and Lemma 12 imply that the only policies
that can be proposed by stable coalitions in equilibrium are either am ∈M(m)
or al ≤ am or ah ≥ am. Recall optimality implies F (am, θm) > F (al, θm) and
SSCP implies F (am, θi) > F (a
l, θi) ∀i ∈ N : θi ≥ θm. Similarly F (am, θm) >
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F (ah, θm) and SSCP implies F (a
m, θi) > F (a
h, θi) ∀i ∈ N : θi ≤ θm. Also, the
coalition structure in which every coalition is a singleton is always stable. Hence
a Condorcet winner among the proposed policies exists, which is also the policy
chosen in an equilibrium of the coalitional game (i). The total order in the
policy available in all reduced games generated by a stable coalition structure
implies the Condorcet winner must be always some am ∈M(m) (ii). The proof
of (iii) is straighforward from (i) and (ii).
Corollary 13. (i) The equilibrium policy is in the Core of a winning coalition,
i.e. x ∈ W → x ∈ K(Am) for some winning coalition Am. Moreover, (ii) the
equilibrium policy is in the Core of the reduced game, i.e. x ∈W → x ∈ K(As)
for any equilibrium policy profile As.
Proof. Straightforward from Theorem 5.
4.2. Comparative statics
Define E to be the space of possible equilibrium policies, i.e. x ∈ E if and
only if x is a winning policy in the voting game.
Lemma 14. The space of possible equilibrium policies E is a sublattice of X.
Proof. Recall that a subset X of L is a sublattice of L if X is closed under
the operations meet and join. It is easy to show that (i) if Am = {m} and
M(m) ∩ M(i) =  for all i 6= m then E = M(m); (ii) if Am = {m} and
M(m) ∩M(i) 6=  for some i 6= m then E ∈ {{xm, xm}, {xm}, {xm}}; (iii) if
Am 6= {m} then E ∈ {{xm, xm}, {xm}, {xm}}. Recall that M(m) is a convex
sublattice of X (see Milgrom, Shannon 1994). Moreover E = {xm, xm} is
a sublattice of X because E ⊆ X and xm ∨ xm = xm, xm ∧ xm = xm hence
{xm∨xm, xm∧xm} ∈ E therefore it satisfies the definition of sublattice. Finally
{xm}, {xm} are sublattices because they are singletons.
The notion of monotonicity is the same as in Milgrom, Shannon (1994) and
it is related to the Strong Set order, namely given two sets Y, Z we say that Y
is grater than or equal to Z in the Strong Set order (Y ≥s Z) if for any y ∈ Y
and z ∈ Z we have y∨ z ∈ Y and y∧ z ∈ Z. This leads to the second important
statement in this paper.
Theorem 15. (Monotone Comparative Statics). The set of policies E that can
be supported in an equilibrium of the voting game is monotonic nondecreasing
in θm.
Proof. From the proof of Lemma 11 consider case (i). Given that E = M(m)
and M(m)is monotonic nondecreasing in θm (Milgrom, Shannon 1994, Theorem
4), then E is as well. Consider cases (ii), (iii). Suppose θm′ > θm, then given
that M(m′) ≥s M(m) (Milgrom, Shannon 1994), then it must be true that
xm′ ≥ xm and xm′ ≥ xm, which implies {xm′ , xm′} ≥s {xm, xm}, {xm′} ≥
{xm}, {xm′} ≥ {xm}. Q.E.D.
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This result is potentially very important in order to establish the direction
of the change in policy induced by a change in the distribution of θ even if
the individual objective function F is not C2 and therefore the First Order
Conditions of the maximization problem cannot be used in order to calculate
the comparative statics of interest. The reason of this is that the result is based
on Milgrom-Shannon’s monotone comparative statics which is very general. One
caveat is that in order to establish the existence of a Political Equilibrium in
my model the additional assumption of continuity of F makes my comparative
statics result slightly less general than the one in their paper.
4.3. Citizen Candidate Model
A class of models that allow for the existence of a political equilibrium even
if the policy space is multidimensional is the one of Citizen-Candidate models
(Besley and Coate 1997; Osborne and Slivinski, 1996). The crucial assumption
of this class of models is that each voter can run for elections as a candidate,
and that each candidate i can credibly commit only to a policy that is in the
set of her ideal points xi ∈M(i). The main shortcoming of this class of models
if one aims to get predictions about the policy choice of a certain group of
individuals is the multiplicity of equilibria. There is neverthless a case in which
this model delivers a unique equilibrium, and this case is described in Corollary
2 (ii) of Besley and Coates 1997. In their model a citizen faces a cost δ to run
for elections, and:
(ii) if xi is a strict Condorcet winner in the set of alternatives
{xj : j ∈ N} and if xi 6= x0, then a political equilibrium exists in
which citizen i runs unopposed for sufficiently small δ.
Consider one particular stable coalition structure in the model presented in this
paper, namely the one in which each coalition is a singleton. In this case the
Pareto set of each coalition coincide with the set of ideal points of its single
member. In this setting, my assumptions about individual preferences (SM and
SSCP) are sufficient to ensure that there is at least one xm ∈ M(m) who is a
Condorcet winner, as a consequence of Corollary 17 (ii).
Therefore we can conclude that:
(i) the result in Besley and Coate for δ → 0 can be interpreted as a particular
case of equilibrium of the coalitional game model presented in this paper;
(ii) the restrictions on individual preferences I assumed in this paper (SM
and SSCP) are also sufficient conditions for a unique equilibrium in which the
median voter run unopposed and implements a policy that is in the set of her
ideal points in the Citizen-Candidate model whenever δ → 0.
4.4. Coalition Structure
In this section I provide some example of stable and unstable coalition struc-
tures in this framework. A key aspect of a stable coalition structure in this model
is given by the following statement.
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Lemma 16. (Lateral Coalitions). Any coalition Aj that include either (a)
individuals with index (i ≤ m) or (b) individuals with index (j ≥ m) is always
stable. Therefore a coalition structure P is stable if each coalition Ai ∈ P satisfies
either (a) or (b).
Proof. Straightforward from Lemma 11 and Lemma 12 and the definition of a
stable coalition structure.
Lemma 17. (Central Coalitions). (i) Any coalition Aj that include both (a)
individuals with index (i < m) and (b) individuals with index (j > m) plus
individual m is stable if at least one policy xm ∈M(m) is in the Strong Core of
a game (N , P (A′) ∪ xm, Fi) for all A′ ⊆ A. (ii) If the (Strong) Core of the full
game (N , X, Fi) is non-empty, then any “Central Coalition” is stable, including
the Grand Coalition of all voters.
Proof. Proof. (i) xm ∈M(m) is in the Strong Core of a game (N , P (A′)∪xm, Fi)
for all A′ ⊆ Aj implies that for any deviation of a subcoalition A′ ⊆ A any
policy a in the Pareto set P (A′) of this coalition is defeatead by xm by majority
voting. Moreover xm ∈ P (A\A′), hence a it is not a “credible threat” to xm for
coalition A. As the statement implies that this is true for all possible A′ ⊆ A,
it implies that xm ∈ SK(A) and therefore A is stable. (ii) Notice that given
that P (A′) ∪ xm ⊆ X this implies that if the (Strong) Core of the full game
(N , X, Fi) is non-empty, then any “Central Coalition” is stable, including the
Grand Coalition of all voters.
Definition 18. A Partisan Equilibrium is an equilibrium in which, given the
policy profile AP and the strategies of all other voters, it is a best response for
each individual i ∈ Aj to vote for policy aj .
The definition implies that in a Partisan Equilibrium no voter has a strict
incentive to vote for a policy different from the one proposed by the coalition
she is part of.
Lemma 19. (Ends-Against-the-Middle Coalitions). (i) Any coalition Aj that
include both (a) individuals with index (i < m) and (b) individuals with index
(j > m) but it does not include individual m is stable if either of the following
is true: (1) aj ∈ M(m); (2) aj ≥ xm for all xm ∈ M(m); (3) aj ≤ xm
for all xm ∈ M(m). Therefore (ii) if M(m) ∩ P (Aj) = Ø, then there is no
Partisan Equilibrium in which one or more coalitions are of the “Ends against
the Middle” type.
Proof. (i) is straightforward from Lemma 11 and Lemma 12 and the definition
of a stable coalition structure. For (ii) notice that any coalition that satisfies
(a) and (b) possess at least one member that strictly prefers any xm ∈ M(m)
to aj whenever xm 6= aj . Condition M(m) ∩ P (Aj) = Ø implies xm 6= aj for
all xm ∈M(m), therefore given that at the equilibrium there will be a coalition
proposing a policy xm ∈ M(m) (because of Lemma 11), then there is at least
one voter i ∈ Aj such that, whenever her vote determines the outcome, would
prefer to vote for xm rather than for a
j .
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For illustrative purposes it may be useful to analyse a case in which the
policy space is bi-dimensional, i.e. X ⊆ R2+, 5 players i.e. N = 5, m = 3
and in which individuals have unique ideal points (black dots). The black circle
represents the winning policy for that coalition structure. Fig. 1A, 1B, 1C
all represent stable coalition structures because condition (a) in Lemma 16 is
satisfied. Notice that Fig. 1C corresponds to the case of the Citizen-Candidate
model described in the previous section. Finally Fig. 1D represents a case in
which condition (a) in Lemma 16 is violated, hence it may not represent a stable
coalition structure.
These examples show that under my assumptions about individual prefer-
ences (SM and SSCP) the Median Voter Theorem result that emerge in the
Citizen-Candidate model is robust to settings in which a much richer policy
space is actually available to the voters, and hence it does not crucially depend
on the strong restrictions that the model proposed by Besley and Coates implies
on this aspect of the political interaction.
The political intuition that underpins the Median Voter result is that if
preferences are ordered by the SSCP then in order to defeat the median voter
it is necessary an Ends-Against-the-Middle Coalition, which is intuitively less
stable than a “Lateral Coalition” or a “Central Coalition”.
4.4.1. Conjecture: Ray-Vohra Stability
Under the assumptions of SM and SSCP a coalition structure is stable if it
is stable in the sense of Ray and Vohra (1997).
This concept of stability is similar to the one I propose in this paper, ex-
cept that the in our proposed solution the profitability from a deviation for a
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subcoalition is not evaluated keeping into account the possibility of future addi-
tional deviations (Recursive Consistency) or the possibility that a non profitable
deviation can generate future deviations by other players and the final outcome
is strictly better for all the deviators (Farsightedness). Moreover, potential de-
viators do not consider the potential threat represented by individuals that are
outside the coalitions the deviators are part of.
The conjecture is correct if Recursive Consistency and Farsightedness can
be incorporated in this model without changing the main result.
If this conjecture can be proved a strong link will arise between the political
equilibrium concept presented in this paper and the one in Levy (2004, 2005),
which is based on the stability concept proposed by Ray and Vohra, namely the
equilibrium would be a refinement of the one in Levy’s voting model.
4.5. Social Choice
It is useful to analyse the characteristics of the Social Preference Ordering
generated by this Political Economy model. We know from Arrow’s Impossi-
bility Theorem (Arrow 1950) that there is no Social Preference Ordering that
satisfies at the same time unrestricted domain (UD), non-dictatorship (ND),
Pareto efficiency (PE), and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Berg-
son (1976) has shown that Citizen-Candidate class of models imply a violation
of IIA.
In my model IIA is not generally satisfied because the restrictions on the
policy space X (which has to be a convex sublattice of Rd) are crucial in order
to ensure a stable outcome that satisfies the Median Voter theorem.
On the other hand Unrestricted Domain (UD) is obviously violated given
the restrictions on individual preferences, in the same way in which the Spence-
Mirrlees conditions imply a violation of UD in the traditional Median Voter
analysis of Downs (1957).
It is easy to verify that ND and PE are satisfied.
Finally the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite
1975) suggest that in this model voters may have an incentive to misrepresent
their true preference orderings.
5. Games with Strategic Complementarities (incomplete)
Modify the setting in 2.1 in the following way. Consider a game with k play-
ers j ∈ J with a subset N ⊂ J of n players who are also voters (n odd); Each
player j ∈ J is endowed with a reflexive, complete and transitive preference
ordering i that can be represented by a continuous and θ − concave utility
function F : X ×Θ×∆→ R.
Define ∆ as the set of vectors of strategies that each player can take outside
of the voting game, with typical element δ = {δ1, δ2, ..., δk}, δ ∈ ∆ .
The game can be either (i) simultaneous or (ii) sequential, i.e. at t = 1
voters play the voting game and the policy is chosen; at t = 2 each player j
chooses y ∈ Yj .
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The voting game requires minimum changes in the definitions, in particular
individual preference relations over policies have to be defined conditional on
beliefs about other players’ strategies, e.g. i (δ˜−i) describes the preference
relation of individual i given beliefs δ˜−i. Consequently the set of policies that
are Pareto superior to a for coalition A becomes pX,A(a, {δ˜−i}i∈A) ≡ {b ∈ X :
b i (δ˜−i)a ∀i ∈ A, b i (δ˜−i)a ∀i ∈ A} and the Pareto set of coalition A
becomes P(A, {δ˜−i}i∈A) ≡ {a ∈ X : pX,A(a, {δ˜−i}i∈A) = }. Similarly social
preferences are now given by  ({δ˜−i}i∈N ) such that
a  ({δ˜−i}i∈N )b if and only if
∑n
i=1 1[maxδi F (a, θi, δi, δ˜−i) ≥ maxδi F (b, θi, δi, δ˜−i)] >
n/2.
Similarly one can modify the definitions in section 3 as follows:
PA(a, ({δ˜−i}i∈N )) ≡ {b ∈ A : b  ({δ˜−i}i∈N )a} is the strictly preferred set;
K(A, ({δ˜−i}i∈N )) ≡ {a ∈ A : PA(a, ({δ˜−i}i∈N )) = } is the Core;
SA(a, {δ˜−i}i∈A) ≡ {b ∈ P(A′, {δ˜−i}i∈A),A′ ⊆ A : b i (δ˜−i)a ∀i ∈ A′, b 
c ∀c ∈ P(A\A′, {δ˜−i}i∈A)} is the set of “credible threats”
SK(A) = {a ∈ P(A) : SA(a, {δ˜−i}i∈A) = } is the S-Core.
Definition 20. A pure strategy equilibrium of this game is:
(a) a coalition structure P∗ = {Aj}hj=1, a policy profile A∗ = {aj}hj=1 and
a set of winning policies W (A∗) ⊆ A∗ such that such that given beliefs about
the strategies y˜: (i) P∗ is a stable coalition structure; (ii)aj ∈ SK(Aj) for all
j = 1, 2, .., h; (iii) W (A∗) is nonempty;
(b) a strategy profile δ ∈ ∆ such that δi ∈ arg maxδ∈∆i F (x˜, θi, δ, δ˜−i) for
each j 6= m and (x, δm) ∈ arg maxx∈X,δ∈∆m F (x, θm, δ, δ˜−m) for i ∈ m;
(c) a set of beliefs about the strategies y˜ ∈ Y˜ such that beliefs are correct
at an equilibrium.
With this new definition of an equilibrium for the game we can state the
following result:
Theorem 21. (i) An equilibrium exists. (ii) In any equilibrium the set of
winning policies W is a subset of the set of ideal points of the median voter m.
(iii) The largest and smallest pure strategy equilibria (and serially undominated
strategy profiles) (a∗m, δ
∗) and (a∗m, δ∗), are monotone nondecreasing functions
of the parameter that identifies the median voter θm.
Proof. See Appendix B (incomplete).
6. Applications
6.1. Meltzer-Richard revisited
In one influential paper Meltzer and Richard (1981) analyse in a unidimen-
sional political economy model the relationship between income distribution of
a society and the extent of redistributive policies. One famous result in in their
paper is that
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[..] An increase in mean income relative to the income of the decisive
voter increases the size of the government.
This result imply a positive relationship between the size of the governamental
sector and a measure of income skewness. It represents a strong prediction that
has been tested empirically in several studies (for a survey of this literature
see De Mello, Tiongson, 2006) with very little success. A majority of early
papers based on cross-country data shows that the relationship between income
skewness and some measure of the size of the government is not statistically
significant (for instance Perotti 1992, 1994, 1996; Persson and Tabellini 1994).
A subsequent stream of more recent studies based on panel data has shown a
significant negative relationship between the two variables (Guveia and Masia
1998, Razin, Sadka and Swagel 2002). These results represent a strong rejection
of the predictions of the theory and a puzzle for the Political Economy literature.
For instance Razin et al. (2002) use a Panel of 13 OECD countries for a
total of 330 observations and use country fixed effects in their specification;
their measure of income skewness is the is the ratio of the income share of
the top quintile to the combined share of the middle three quartiles and their
measure of the size of the government is the average tax rate. They find a
negative and statistically significant relationship between income skewness and
average tax rate (see Table 1). Interestingly they show that if they perform the
same analysis using a different dependent variable, namely the total amount
of social transfers, the relationship becomes positive (although not statistically
significant). This represents a second challenge for the theory because the MR
model implies that the size of the government and the amount of redistributive
governmental intervention should move in the same direction as a result of a
change in the degree of income skewness.
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In this section I will show how the result in Meltzer and Richard (MR)
does not generally survive in a political equilibrium if a richer policy space is
available to voters, and that the opposite prediction may emerge if one allows for
a more realistic model. Moreover I will show that in such augmented model the
progressivity of the tax sistem (and not the size of the government) is tweakly
increasing in the degree of income skewness. Razin’s findings suggest that a
stronger degree of skewness in the income distribution should imply a lower
average tax rate while the amount of social transfers should be unaffected or
larger. Intuitively a tax system of this kind is a more progressive one, so both
prediction of the augmented model seems to be more consistent with empirical
evidence. The conclusion of this analysis is that the empirical puzzles described
above can be partially explained by the excessively restrictive assumptions of
the MR model.
6.1.1. Setting
The setup is similar to the one in MR, with the difference that the budget
of the government is spent not only in in-cash redistribution, but also in Public
Goods. For simplicity I am going to assume that the voters’ population is a
continuum with Lebesgue measure 1. This can be interpreted as a limit case in
which he number of voters n is a very large number.
Policy Space. The policy space denoted by X ⊆ R2 is bi-dimensional with
tipical element χ = (x, Y ). I am going to assume χ ∈ X if and only if x ∈ [x, x¯]
and Y ∈ [0, Y¯ ] with 0 < x < x ≤ 1. Because a policy χ a vector (x, Y ) any
endogenous variable is going to be a function of (x, Y ). Notice that the partially
ordered set (X,≤) is a complete and convex sublattice of R2.
Preferences. Each voter i has a C2 concave utility function:
Ui = U(ci, Y, li)
where ci is i’s consumption of private goods, Y is the the quantity of Public
Goods that is provided by the government and li is leisure. I assume ci ≥ 0,
Y ≥ 0 and T ≥ li ≥ 0. Individuals allocate their time between consumption
and leisure such that
li = T − hi
where hi ∈ [0, T ] is i’s hours of work and T is the total endowment of time.
Define yi = hiωi as the pre-tax income of an individual i with wage ωi and that
supplies an amount hi of hours of labour. Individuals differ only in their wages
that are distributed according to a continuous right-skewed distribution with
cdf G.
Labour supply. The labour supply of each individual is endogenous in (ωi, x, Y ).
In particular at each policy vector χ ∈ X an individual i solves a problem of
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choice over consumption and leisure (C-L problem). After substituting the time
endowment constraint into the utility function the problem is in the form:
max
c∈[0,c¯],h∈[0,T ]
U(c, Y, T − h)
subject to an individual budget constraint c−c(hωi, x, Y ) ≤ 0 for some function
c(hiωix, Y ). Given this that we can define the optimal labour supply function
as a continuous function in the form:
h∗i = h(ωi, x, Y ) = arg max
c ≥ 0
h ∈ [0, T ]
U(c, Y, T − h)
subject to c − c(hiωix, Y ) ≤ 0. Moreover one can define a continuous function
representing optimal earned income:
y∗i = y(ωi, x, Y ) = ωih(ωi, x, Y )
Define the average income as:
y¯ = y¯(x, Y, g,G(ω)) =
ωˆ¯
ω
y(ω, x, Y )dG(ω)
Notice that y¯ is itself endogenous in (x, Y,G(ω)).
Tax system. The tax system is the same as in MR, namely individual post-tax
income is determined by a linear tax rate t and by a lump-sum grant g. Define
x = 1 − t. Therefore the after tax income that is equivalent to the amount of
private good consumed by individual i will be given by:
ci = xyi + g
The government has to break even, such that the governmental budget con-
straint is given by:
(1− x)y¯(x, Y,G(ω))− Y − g ≥ 0
which simply states that the total governmental spending cannot exceed the
total tax revenue. Assuming that the constraint above is binding in equilibrium
(and later sufficient conditions for this will be provided) we can solve for g to
get:
gˆ ≡ gˆ(x, Y ) = (1− x)y¯(x, Y )− Y
and then substitute gˆ into the formula for ci:
ci = xyi + (1− x)y¯ − Y
Therefore the pre-tax income of an individual i previously defined lies in the
range y∗i ∈ [0, yTi ], where yTi = ωiT is the maximum income that individual i
can achieve. Notice that gˆ is itself a function of y¯ and hence of hi, but the effect
of the individual choice of hi on gˆ disappears because the number of voters is
infinitely large and therefore gˆ is independent of hi in this example.
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Objective function . The objective function of an individual in the voting game
is the indirect utility function of the C-L problem that represents the utility
achieved by an individual at the optimal level of labour supply as a function
of the policy vector (x, Y ) and of the individual wage ωi. Substituting the
equations for gˆ, ci, yi, y¯ from the previous paragraphs into Ui we can get the
individual indirect utility function:
V (x, Y, ;ω) = U(xy∗i + (1− x)y¯ − Y, Y, T − h∗i )
Notice that we also need to rule out the possibility that ci is negative for some
individuals at some (x, Y ) ∈ X. It is sufficient to impose that Y¯ is such that
min
x∈[x,x¯]
(1− x)y¯ − Y + xy∗i ≥ 0
for all i and all Y ∈ [0, Y¯ ] (this condition ensure that gˆ cannot get too negative
and induce negative consumption for some individual). Also notice that if y¯ > 0
for all x ∈ [x, x¯] at Y = 0 the continuity of y∗i and y¯ ensures that there is always
a Y¯ > 0 such that the condition above is satisfied.
Size of the Government and Progressivity. The other two elements to be defined
are the size of the government and the progressivity of the tax system. In Meltzer
and Richard’s paper the size of the government is simply the marginal tax rate
t = 1 − x. More correctly one should define it as either the total government
spending or equivalently as the total tax revenue. A third possibility is to use
the average tax rate. The formula for the total revenue is:
TR(x, Y ) ≡
ωˆ¯
ω
(1− I [(1− x)y(ωi, x, Y )− gˆ ≤ 0]) ((1− x)y(ωi, x, Y )− gˆ) dG(ω)
where
I [a ≤ 0] =
{
1 if a ≤ 0
0 otherwise
I [a ≤ 0]is the indicator function that has value equal to 0 if individual i is a
net tax payer and value equal to 1 if individual i is a net receiver of subsidies.
So the integral defining TR represents the sum of net tax paid. Given that
the net tax revenue is used to finance the provision of a public good Y and
the subsidies to the individuals who pay no net taxes, one can define the total
government spending as the sum of net subsidies plus the expenditure in public
goods, namely:
S(x, Y ) ≡
 ωˆ¯
ω
I [(1− x)y(ωi, x, Y )− gˆ ≤ 0] [gˆ − (1− x)y(ωi, x, Y )] dG(ω)
+Y
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Another possibility is to use the average tax rate, which is defined as the total
net tax revenues divided by total income:
AT (x, Y ) =
 ωˆ¯
ω
[(1− x)y(ωi, x, Y )− gˆ] dG(ω)
 /y¯
In the Meltzer and Richard’s paper the simplification that the size of the
government is simply equal to t has limited consequences: given that the policy
space is unidimensional and there is no Public Good (equivalent to Y = 0 in
the above formulas) it is easy to show that the size of the government is weakly
increasing in t under relatively weak assumptions, hence the conclusions of their
paper would survive even if we define the size of the government in any of the
three ways suggested above. For instance if one chooses measure S(x, 0, G(ω))
we have that in the Meltzer and Richard’s case we get
∂S
∂x
=
ωˆ¯
ω
I [(1− x)y∗i − gˆ ≤ 0]
[
y − y¯ − (1− x)
(
dy¯
dx
− dy(ωi, x, Y )
dx
)]
dG(ω)
Notice that the above is negative if the marginal effect of a change in x does
not vary too much across different income levels (in particular it is easy to show
that the above is negative if the tax elasticity of labout supply is negative and
constant in ωi). Therefore the size of the government tend to move in the same
direction as t = 1− x. In my setting instead I need to use one of the definitions
above and I will fully keep into account the endogeneity of earned income. The
progressivity of the tax system is defined using the index proposed by Slitor
(1948). Consider the tax rate faced by individual i, defined as the ratio of
individual net tax payment to gross income:
Ti(x, g, yi) =
(1− x)yi − g
yi
The progressivity PRi = PR(x, g, yi) faced by individual i is defined as the
change of the tax rate induced by a marginal increase in income:
PR(x, g, yi) =
∂Ti(x, g, yi)
∂yi
∣∣∣∣
x,g
=
g
y2i
This measure of progressivity is income dependent, but given the structure of
the tax system assumed in this example the sign of the index and the direction
of the effect of the MDIS are the same for all individuals as they both depend
uniquely on g (at constant yi). Therefore in this framework we can define
without loss of generality the average progressivity as:
PR(x, g,G(ω)) ≡ EG [PRi(x, g, yi)] = EG
[
g
y2i
∣∣∣∣x, Y ] = gσ(x, Y,G(ω))
for σ(x, Y,G(ω)) = EG
[
1/y2|x, Y ].
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6.1.2. Existence
In this section I state a set of sufficient conditions for the existence of the
Coalitional voting equilibrium proposed in the previous sections of this paper.
This represent only one possible set of restrictions and a more general description
of the sufficient conditions for existence is described in Appendix C.
For the purposes of this section I will assume a simplified problem where
voters have preferences represented by the utility function:
U(ci, Y, li) = u(ci) + a(Y ) + γli
where u(·) and a(·) are continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave in
c, Y . I will refer to this setting as the augmented MR model in the rest of this
paper. The indirect utility becomes:
V (x, Y, ωiG(ω)) = u(xy
∗
i + (1− x)y¯ − Y/n) + a(Y ) + γ(T − h∗i )
The sufficient conditions for exsistence of a Coalitional Equilibrium are the
following:
1. Individual income is such that yT > y∗i > 0 for all i and all (x, Y ) ∈ X
(A1);
2. The derivative
dh∗i
dt < 0 for all ωi > ω¯ at all (x, Y ) ∈ X and it is finite for
all i at all (x, Y ) ∈ X (A2).
Proof: See Appendix C.
The intuition for this result is that
dh∗i
dt < 0 corresponds to a relatively
high elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure. This condition
ensure that and individual with higher wage has stronger preferences for a low
marginal tax rate in comparison with an individual with low wage. Notice that
condition 2 is equivalent in this setting to +∞ > dy∗idx > 0. Also notice that
dy∗i
dx
= −ωi ∂hi
∂t
+ ωi
∂hi
∂g
∂gˆ
∂x
It is easy to show that for general convex preferences ∂hi∂g < 0 because an
increase in g corresponds to a pure income effect for the individual. If ∂gˆ∂x < 0
at all (x, Y ) ∈ X, then for condition 2 to be satisfied it is sufficient that ∂hi∂t < 0
for all i at all (x, Y ) ∈ X. Therefore if the elasticity of the labour supply with
respect to the marginal tax rate is weakly negative for all i at all (x, Y ) ∈ X.
This assumption is reasonable and consistent with empirical findings (quote).
6.1.3. Comparative statics
In this section I will describe a Comparative Statics exercise and use the
result in Theorem 15 in order to show that in this augmented model under
certain conditions the predictions are very different from the ones in Metzer
and Richard’s paper.
Suppose that the sufficient conditions for a coalitional equilibrium described
in the previous section are satisfied. Denote with (x∗, Y ∗) an equilibrium policy
vector. The exercise is the following.
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1. Fix the policy vector at the equilibrium level (x∗, Y ∗).
2. Change the wage distribution G(ω) such that the under the new wage
distribution G˜(ω)
(a) the median income is strictly higher: y˜∗m > y
∗
m;
(b) the change in median income (y˜m − ym) is small;
(c) the average income y¯ is unchanged.
3. Find how the equilibrium level of the policy vector (x, Y ) changes after
this trasformation.
I will refer to this exercise as marginal decrease in income skewnwess (MDIS ).
The exercise is complex because the labour supply of each individual h(ωi, x, Y )
is endogenous. This imply that a change in the wage distribution may affect
the average income y¯ and the median income y∗m in non trivial ways even if the
policy vector is kept constant. On the other hand we cannot directly manipulate
the income distribution because it is endgenous in this model.
I am going to solve this problem by assuming the same restrictions that
ensure existence of a coalitional equilibrium stated in secton 6.1.2.
One important consequence of those restrictions is that yi is strictly increas-
ing in ωi for all i. This monotonicity result generally applies for less restrictive
preferences because given that 1/xωi can be interpreted as the relative price of
consumption and leisure for an individual with wage ωi, the the statement “yi
is strictly increasing in ωi” is equivalent to assume that ci is not a Giffen good,
which is a very weak assumption (see Appendix C).
Define R(y|x, Y ) and R˜(y|x, Y ) as the endogenous cumulative income dis-
tributions function conditional on a certain policy vector (x, Y ) corresponding
respectively to the wage dstributions G(ω) and G˜(ω) . The assumption that y¯
is unchanged can be written as:
ER [y|x, Y ] = ER˜ [y|x, Y ]
The relationship between G and R is easy to show under the assumption that
y∗i is strictly increasing in ωi for all i such that the function y
∗
i = y(ωi, x, Y )
that represents individual income conditional on the policy vector (x, Y ) is a
strictly increasing function of ω. Given the cumulative distribution G(ω) func-
tion denote with g(ω) = G′(ω) the corresponding pdf. The result that under
the restriction stated yi is strictly increasing in ωi implies ω < ωi ↔ y < yi
and therefore R(y(ω, x, Y )|x, Y ) = G(ω) for all ω ∈ [ω, ω¯]. It also implies that
y∗m = y(ωm, x, Y ) is the median income under the distribution R(y|x, Y ) if and
only if ωm is the median wage under the distribution G(ω). These results allow
one to restate the requirements of our Comparative Statics exercise as funcions
of the wage distribution, namely:
1. Same mean income under g and g˜ (1) :
ωˆ¯
ω
y(ω, x, Y ) [g(ω)− g˜(ω)] dω = 0
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2. Median income that is strictly higher under distribution g in comparison
with distribution g˜ (2):
ωmˆ
ω
[g(ω)− g˜(ω)] dω > 0
where ωm is the median wage under the distribution G(ω). Any distribution
with pdf g˜ that satisfies these two requirements represent a Comparative Statics
exercise that is equivalent to the MDIS described above. The advantage of this
setting if that we can express the exercise in terms of the exogenous parameters
ωi and therefore we can use the results in Theorem 5 and Theorem 15 of this
paper.
Under the restriction A1 and A2 stated in section 6.1.2 we can state the
following results:
Lemma 22. In the augmented MR model, if the progressivity of the tax system
is sufficiently low, (i) the the size of the government and (ii) the expenditure
in public goods are weakly increasing in the median income (at constant mean
income).
Proof. See Appendix C.
This Lemma suggests that, differently from what is implied by the result in
Meltzer and Richard’s paper, a society that experiences a fall in income skewness
may face an increase in the size of the government.
Lemma 23. In the augmented MR model, the progressivity of the tax system
is weakly decreasing in the in the median income (at constant mean income).
Proof. See Appendix D
Lemma 20 states an additional prediction that we can derive in the aug-
mented MR model, which seems consistent with the findings in Razin and Sadka
(2002). They find that the effect of an increase in income skewness on the av-
erage tax rate and on the total amount of social transfers have different signs,
namely the average tax rate falls and the total amount of social transfers rises
(this second result is not statisticaly significant) or is unchanged. The link with
the predicitions of the model presented in this section is given by the fact that a
tax system that has lower average tax rate and (weakly) higher social transfers
is actually a more progressive tax system, which is in line with the prediction
of Lemma 20.
6.2. Arms Race in a Democratic country
Consider a democratic country whose citizens vote about a linear tax rate, a
lump-sum grant and the level of spending in national defence in presence of an
external threating nation. Notice that all citizens have same preferences about
national defence. The utility function of a citizen with income is:
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Ui(x, y, Ii, Y ) = f(x, y) + u(ci, li)
where x is the national spending in defence, y is the level of spending of
the rival country, ci is the expenditure in consumption and li is the hours of
leisure enjoyed by citizen i. Following the literature about arms race I assume
fxy ≥ 0, i.e. an increase in expenditures in national defence in a rival country
increases the marginal utility of governmental spending in national defence.,
and ucl ≥ 0. Individual i’s consumption is given by her disposable income such
that ci ≤ (1 − t)hiθi + g and the governmental budget constraint is balanced:
t
∑n
i=1 hiθi ≥ x+ ng.
Lemma 24. If the difference between median and mean pre-tax income is suf-
ficiently small and a change in the tax system that benefit the riches and harm
the poors is implemented by the government, then the same government will also
increase the expenditure in national defence. Moreover in equilibrium all rival
countries will increase their expenditures in national defence.
Proof. See Appendix D.
7. Conclusions
This paper proposes a model of political interaction in which voters can form
coalitions in order to increase the space of policies that can be proposed and in
which this coalitions are required to be stable in a peculiar sense. I show that
the assumptions of Supermodularity and Strict Single Crossing Property of vot-
ers’ objective functions are sufficient for the existence of a political equilibrium
in a multidimensional policy space. Moreover I show that under the same as-
sumptions a version of the Median Voter Theorem holds and as a consequence
a monotone comparative statics result of the equilibrium outcomes is derived.
The paper describes a tool that can be useful to correct the predictions de-
livered by traditional Downsian models for some common Political Economy
questions in the literature and potentially to explain the poor empirical perfor-
mance of these predictions.
A feature that emerges is that the model is sufficiently flexible to deal with
games that are more complex than simple voting games and can deliver inter-
esting answer to questions in the field that cannot be easily analysed in the
traditional framework.
I claim that this results can be applied to addess a number of different
questions in the field and to light shed on some controversial results in the
literature and that it represents an elegant an parsimonious way of dealing
with one of the most commons problems that emerge if one aims to model
Political Choices in an economic model. Moreover, the model is sufficiently
general to be suitable to describe many different Political Economy problems
and to incorporate some results that are well established in the literature as
special cases of my framework.
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Despite of these achivements the assumptions that must be satisfied in order
to prove the two main results of the paper are quite restrictive so their applica-
bility should be evaluated in relationship to the credibility of those assumptions
in each specific application.
AppendixA. Lemma 5
If F satisfies SM and SSCP then the Pareto Set P(A) of a coalition of players
A ⊆ N is such that x ∈ P(A) only if x ≥ sup {M(l)} and x ≤ inf {M(h)} where
l = min(A) and h = max(A) .
Proof. Suppose y  xl but y ∈ P(A). Because of the optimality of xl and be-
cause X is a lattice, it must be true that F (xl, θl) ≥ F (y∧xl, θl). Supermodular-
ity implies F (y∨xl, θl) ≥ F (y, θl). Notice that y  xl implies y∨xl 6= y. Hence
the Strict Single Crossing Property implies F (y ∨ xl, θi) ≥ F (y, θi) ∀θi > θl.
Given that θi > θl is true for all θ ∈ A, θ 6= θl we have that ∃x ∈ X such
that F (x, θ) ≥ F (y, θ) ∀θ ∈ A and F (x, θ) > F (y, θ) for at least one θ ∈ A,
i.e pX,A(y) 6= . Hence y /∈ P(A). Similarly one can show that x ∈ A only if
x ≤ xh. Q.E.D.
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Define the following game. A nonempty set N indexes the players, and each
player’s strategy set is Si, partially ordered by ≥ . The space of strategy profiles
is then S, and player i has payoff function pii(zi, z−i). Following Milgrom,
Shannon 1994 such a game has (ordinal) strategic complementarities if for every
i: (1) Si is a compact lattice; (2) pii is upper semi-continuous in zi for z−i fixed,
and continuous in z−i for fixed zi; (3) pin is quasisupermodular in zi and satisfies
the single crossing property in (zi; z−i). Say zi = δi, z−i = (x, δ−i) for all i 6= m
and zm = (x, δi), z−m = δ−i.
INCOMPLETE.
AppendixC. Lemma 19
In the augmented MR model, if the progressivity of the tax system is suffi-
ciently low, (i) the the size of the government and (ii) the expenditure in public
goods are weakly increasing in the median income (at constant mean income).
AppendixC.1. Existence
Recall that the sufficient conditions for the existence of a Coalitional Equi-
librium are:
(a) The Policy Space X is a convex and complete sublattice of Rd;
(b) The Objective Function V i satisfies SM and SSCP for all i and all χ ∈ X.
Restrictions for (a). (a) Condition (a) is always satisfied as the Policy Space
assumed in this example is a convex and complete sublattice of R2.
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Restrictions for (b). The following section shows that assumptins A1, A2 are
sufficient for SM and SSCP.
Proof. Denote V iab =
∂V i
∂a∂b . Recall that given that V
i is a C2 function suf-
ficient conditions for SM and SSCP are V ixY ≥ 0, V ixω > 0 and V iY ω > 0
for all i and all (x, Y ) ∈ X. First of all we need to calculate the marginal
effects of x and Y on Vi, denoted with
∂Vi
∂x and
∂Vi
∂Y respectively. These deriva-
tives correspond to the FOC of the maximization problem. Denote with U iz =
∂
∂z [U(xy
∗
i + (1− x)y − Y/n, Y, 1− h∗i )] for some variable z. Recall assumption
1 implies: yT > y∗i > 0 for all i and all x, Y ∈ X, which is equivalent to say that
all individuals are in an internal maximum of their problem of utility maximiza-
tion over consumption and leisure for any policy (x, Y ). This assumption allows
me to use an Envelope theorem when calculating ∂Vi∂x and
∂Vi
∂Y , for instance:
∂Vi
∂x
= U ic
(
y∗i − y + (1− x)
dy¯
dx
)
+ U icx
dy∗i
dx
+ U il
dl∗i
dx
Because we have assumed to be in an interior solution of of the consump-
tion/leisure problem, then the FOC is: U icxωi − U il = 0. Using this result
into ∂Vi∂x we get:
∂Vi
∂x
= U ic
(
yi − y + (1− x)dy¯
dx
)
In the same way one can show that:
∂Vi
∂Y
= U ic
(
(1− x)dy¯
dx
− 1
)
+ U iY
SSCP. Calculate the derivative of V ix and V
i
Y w.r.t. ωi. In this example we have:
V ixω =
[
U icc ·
(
x+
1− x
n
)
∂yi
∂ωi
− Ucl · ∂hi
∂ωi
](
yi − y + (1− x)dyˆi
dx
)
+
+U ic
∂yi
∂ωi
(
1− 1
n
)
=
Notice that if the equilibrium exists and it is an internal one, then FOCs imply
y∗m − y + (1 − x) dydx = 0 where y∗m is the income of the median voter. This is
true because Uc(xωmhm + (1−x)y−Y/n, 1−hm) > 0. We are not going to use
this reslt anyway because we do not want to exclude the possibility of a corner
equilibrium.
V iY ω =
[
−U icc · x
∂yi
∂ωi
+ Ucl · dhi
dωi
](
1
n
− (1− x) dy¯
dY
)
+U icY ·x
∂yi
∂ωi
+UY l· dhi
dωi
> 0
SM. Calculate the cross derivative V ixY . In this example we have:
V ixY =
[
U icc ·
(
x
dyi
dY
+ (1− x) dy¯
dY
− 1
n
)
− U icl ·
dhi
dY
+ UcY
](
yi − y + (1− x)dy
dx
)
+
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+U ic ·
(
dyi
dY
− dy¯
dY
+ (1− x) d
2y¯
dxdY
)
Therefore a coalitional political equilibrium exists if the three ineqalites above
are satisfied for all i at all (x, Y ) ∈ X.
At this level of generality anyway it is had to understand what class of
individual preferences and wage distributions will ensure existence, therefore it
is useful to restrict preferences in a way that makes the condition easy to impose
and to interpret.
Additive Separability.. Say the utility function is additively separable, i.e.
U(ci, Y, li) = u(ci) + a(Y ) + b(li)
Then the conditions for SM and SSCP reduce to:
V ixω =
(
uicc · x
dci
dx
∣∣∣∣
hi
+ uic
)
∂yi
∂ωi
> 0
V iY ω = u
i
cc · x
∂yi
∂ωi
dg
dY
> 0
V ixY = u
i
cc ·
dci
dY
dci
dx
∣∣∣∣
hi
+ uic ·
d2ci
dxdY
≥ 0
Proof. Notice that at any point that is an internal maximum for some i it must
be true that dgdY < 0 (else there is a policy (x
′, Y ′) with x′ = x, Y ′ > Y implying
g′ ≥ g, which is Pareto superior to (x, Y ) and therefore it cannot be an optimum
for any i). Neverthless dgdY may be positive in some other points of the policy
space, hence if we do not add further assumptions we need to impose dgdY < 0 for
all (x, Y ) ∈ X. Later I will show that y∗i > 0 for all i and utility function linear
in leisure this condition is unnecessary. If c is not a Giffen Good and n is large it
must be that ∂yi∂ωi > 0 for all individuals with h > 0. This result can be verified
by noticing that for fixed policy vector (x, Y ) and fixed wage distribution G(ω)
the individual problem of choice over consumption and leisure can be interpreted
as a problem of demand with endowments in the form:
max
c≥0,l∈[0,T ]
u(c, Y, l)
s.t. Pcc+Pll ≤ Ii. Now we are going to use the governmental budget constraint
to specify a functional form for Pc, P l, I. Then the budget constraint can be
written as:
1
ωix
c+ l ≤ T + gˆ
if n grows large gˆ becomes independent of li conditional on (x, Y ) and given
that G(ω) is kept fixed, the above becomes:
1
ωix
c+ l ≤ T + g˜(x, Y )
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for some function g˜. Therefore Pc =
1
ωix
, Pl = 1, Ii = T + g˜(x, Y ). Finally
notice that a (weak) Giffen Good is such that:
∂c∗i
∂Pc
≥ 0. For large n we have
c∗i = xy
∗
i + g˜(x, Y ) therefore
∂c∗i
∂Pc
= x
∂y∗i
∂Pc
So using the fact that ∂Pc∂ωi = − 1ω2i x we can rewrite:
∂y∗i
∂ωi
=
1
x
∂c∗i
∂Pc
∂Pc
∂ωi
= − ∂c
∗
i
∂Pc
1
ω2i x
2
> 0
and given that we have assumed x > 0, ωi > 0 this implies that the above
is strictly positive whenever
∂c∗i
∂Pc
< 0, i.e. c is not a Giffen Good, as stated.
Therefore for internal solutions (T > h∗i > 0) of the individual problem of
choice over consumption and leisure the condition is satisfied.
Notice that if some individuals are in a corner solution with h∗i = T then
yTi = ωiT which is strictly increasing in ωi so the condition
∂y∗i
∂ωi
> 0 is also
satisfied. Even if we establish that
∂y∗i
∂ωi
> 0 for all i and we impose that dgdY < 0
for all (x, Y ) ∈ X we are left with the following conditions: dcidx
∣∣
hi
<
uic
uiccx
for
all y∗i ≥ y¯ − (1 − x) dy¯dx and uicc · dcidY dcidx
∣∣
hi
+ uic · d
2ci
dxdY > 0 for all i and all
(x, Y ) ∈ X.
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These two conditions are hard to interpret and depend on endogenous objects
(such as y∗i ) hence they are not easy to impose. The last step to simplify
the conditions for existence is to impose the condition stated in section 6.1.2,
namely:
Utility function additively separable and linear in leisure:
U(ci, Y, li) = u(ci) + a(Y ) + γli
(A1). Individual income is such that yT > y∗i > 0 for all i and all (x, Y ) ∈ X;
(A2). The derivative
dh∗i
dt < 0 for all ωi > ω¯ at all (x, Y ) ∈ X and it is finite
for all i at all (x, Y ) ∈ X (A2).
Now I am going to show that if one imposes these the three restrictions
then the conditions for existence of a voting equilibrium are satisfied. Recall
the conditions to verify are V ixω > 0, V
i
Y ω > 0 and V
i
xY ≥ 0 for all i at all
(x, Y ) ∈ X.
Preliminary steps. Using the FOC f the C-L problem to calculate
∂y∗i
∂ωi
. Now
in the case of interior solutions one can use the FOC of the C-L problem to
calculate ∂yi∂x :
ucxωi − γ = 0
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Totally differentiate to get:
∂y∗i
∂ωi
=
{
−uic
uiccωix
> 0 for interior
0 for corner
for all i and all (x, Y ) ∈ X. Notice that for all yi ≤ y¯−(1−x) ∂y¯∂x it is immediate
to verify that uicc · x dcidx
∣∣
hi
+ uic > 0 is always true because u
i
c > 0 and u
i
cc < 0
by assumption and
dc∗i
dx
∣∣∣
hi
= y∗i − y¯ + (1− x) ∂y¯∂x . As before totally differentiate
the FOC of the C-L problem to get:
∂yi
∂x
=
{
−uc
uccx2
+ 1x
(
yi − y¯ + (1− x) ∂y¯∂x
)
for interior
0 for corner
A2 implies that ∂yi∂x is a finte number. A1 restrict the cases to internal solutions
because it implies T > hi > 0, hence we can solve:
∂yi
∂x
=
−uic
uiccx
2
− 1
x
(
yi − y¯ + (1− x)∂y¯
∂x
)
∂y¯
∂x
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(y > yTi > 0)
[ −uic
uiccx
2
− 1
x
(
yi − y¯ + (1− x)∂y¯
∂x
)]
And using assumption A1 the above reduces to:
∂y¯
∂x
=
ωˆ¯
ω
−uic
uiccx
dG(ω)
Define RAi to be the Arrow-Pratt Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion, i.e.
RAi = −u
i
cc
uic
ci. Then we can rewrite:
∂y¯
∂x
=
1
x
ωˆ¯
ω
c∗i
RAi
dG(ω)
∂yi
∂x
=
c∗i
RAix2
− yi − y¯
x
− (1− x)
x2
ωˆ¯
ω
c∗i
RAi
dG(ω)
Notice that this formula imply that ∂yi∂x is a finite number for all i, as initially
assumed.
Finally recall that in Section 6.1.1 we assumed that the governmental budget
constraint it binding. A sufficient condition for that under restrictions A1, A2
is that −y¯ + (1− x) ∂y¯∂x < 0 for all (x, Y ) ∈ X.
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SSCP: V ixω > 0 for all i and all (x, Y ) ∈ X. Now recall that the condition we
need to verify is:
V ixω =
(
uicc · x
dci
dx
∣∣∣∣
hi
+ uic
)
∂yi
∂ωi
> 0
Substituting the formulas for ∂yi∂ωi and
dci
dx
∣∣
hi
into the above equation we get:
V ixω =
[
x
(
yi − y¯ + (1− x)∂y¯
∂x
)
uicc + u
i
c
] −uic
uccωix
=
=
[
x
(
yi − y¯ + (1− x)∂y¯
∂x
)
ucc
uc
+ 1
] − (uic)2
uccωix
Now substitute the formula for ∂y¯∂x into the formula for V
i
xω to get:
=
−x
yi − y¯ + (1− x)
 1
x
ωˆ¯
ω
c∗i
RAi
dG(ω)
− uicci
uiccci
 uic
ωix
=
=
−
yi − y¯ + (1− x) ωˆ¯
ω
c∗i
RAi
dG(ω)
+ ci
xCRRAi
 uic
ωi
=
Now recall the previous result:
∂y∗i
∂x
=
c∗i
RAix2
− yi − y¯
x
− (1− x)
x2
ωˆ¯
ω
c∗i
RAi
dG(ω)
V ixω =
[
∂y∗i
∂x
x+
c∗i
xRAi
]
uic
ωi
> 0
The above is strictly greater than zero if
∂y∗i
∂x > 0, which is equivalent to
∂y∗i
∂t < 0.
Therefore the condition for existence reduces to
∂y∗i
∂t < 0 for all i such that yi > y¯.
Notice that if the utility function is Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA)
a sufficient condition for
∂y∗i
∂t < 0 is RA ≤ 1. Q.E.D.
SSCP: V iY ω > 0 for all i and all (x, Y ) ∈ X. Recall the condition previously
derived is:
VY ωi = U
i
cc · x
∂yi
∂ωi
dg
dY
> 0
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Given the strict concavity of u we have U icc > 0 and we have shown in the
previous section that under Assumption 1 ∂yi∂ωi > 0 for all i. So we need
dg
dY > 0.
Use the definition of gˆ such that:
dgˆ
dY
= (1− x) dy¯
dY
− 1
Because the utility function that is linear in leisure: b(li) = γli. This implies:
∂y∗i
∂Y
=
1− (1− x) dy¯dY
x
and from this we can get:
∂y¯
∂Y
=
∂y∗i
∂Y
= 1
and therefore
VY ωi = −U icc · x
−uicx
uiccωix
=
uicx
ωi
> 0
SM: V ixY ≥ 0 for all i and all (x, Y ) ∈ X.
VxY = Ucc · dci
dY
dci
dx
∣∣∣∣
hi
+ Uc · d
dY
(
dci
dx
∣∣∣∣
hi
)
Proof. Recall that:
∂y∗i
∂Y
=
1− (1− x) dy¯dY
x
and from this we can get:
∂y¯
∂Y
=
∂y∗i
∂Y
= 1
For all i. Recall that ci = xωihi + (1− x)y¯ − Y hence:
∂ci
∂Y
= x
∂yi
∂Y
+ (1− x) ∂y¯
∂Y
− 1 = 0
and
dci
dx
∣∣∣∣
hi
= yi − y¯ + (1− x)dy¯
dx
d
dY
(
dci
dx
∣∣∣∣
hi
)
=
dyi
dx
− dy¯
dx
+ (1− x) d
2y¯
dxdY
= 1− 1 + 0 = 0
wsuch that
V ixY = 0
for all (x, Y ) ∈ X and for all i, as required.
Summarizing a set of sufficient conditions for existence of a voting equilib-
rium is: utility function additively separable in (c, Y, l) and linear in leisure,
yT > y∗i > 0 for all i and all all (x, Y ) ∈ X ,dyidt ≤ 0 for all y∗i > y¯ for all
(x, Y ) ∈ X. Q.E.D.
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AppendixC.2. Comparative Statics.
If the sufficient conditions are satisfied the main theorem of this paper en-
sures that the equilibrium policy is going to be the unique ideal point of the
median voter ωm. The theorems 5 and 15 in this paper imply that if the condi-
tions for existence are satisfied, then the optimal policy vector (x∗, Y ∗) is:
1. An ideal point of the median voter m, i.e.
(x∗, Y ∗) ∈ arg max
(x,Y )∈X
V (x, Y, ωiG(ω))
2. Monotone weakly increasing in the parameter tht identifies the median
voter ωm.
Notice that in this example V (x, Y, ωiG(ω)) is strictly concave in (x, Y ) therefore
the ideal point of each individual is unique.
Define4G(ω) to be any trasformation G˜(ω) of the income distribution G(ω)
such that 4ωm = ω˜m − ωm > 0 and because under restrictions A1, A2 we have
dy∗i
dωi
> 0 for all i, this imply 4ym = y˜m − ym > 0.
Denote the changes in x∗and Y ∗induced by the Comparative Statics exercise
MDIS with 4x4G and
4Y
4G . Theorem 15 implies:
4x
4G ≥ 0 and 4Y4G ≥ 0. In order
to use Theorem 15 anyway we need to ensure that the transformation 4G does
not cause a change in the individual objective function V (x, Y, ωiG(ω)).
Recall that the objective function is
V (x, Y, ωiG(ω)) = u(xy
∗
i + (1− x)y¯ − Y ) + a(Y ) + γ(T − h∗i )
We need to verify that the CS exercise MDIS as defined in Section 6 implies
that V (x, Y, ωiG(ω)) is independent of G(ω) conditional on (x, Y ). Recall that
y∗i and h
∗
i are not affected by changes in G that keep y¯ unchanged (this is true
because of the assumption that the voters are a continuum). On the other hand
Vi is a function of y¯. Hence if y¯ is kept constant then Vi is not affected by a
change in G. Hence the assumptions of theorems 5 and 15 are satisfied and we
can claim that the equilibrium policy vector (x, Y ) is weakly increasing in ym
at constant y¯, i.e. 4x4G ≥ 0 and 4Y4G ≥ 0. This proves the part (ii) of Lemma 19.
In order to prove part (i) we need to use the definition of the size of the
government as the total government spending:
S(x, Y,G(ω)) ≡
 ωˆ¯
ω
I [(1− x)y(ωi, x, Y )− gˆ ≤ 0] [gˆ − (1− x)y(ωi, x, Y )] dG(ω)
+Y
For small changes in ωm one can calculate for 4ωm small enough:
4S
4G =
ωˆ¯
ω
I [(1− x)yi − g ≤ 0] 4x4G
(
yi − (1− x)∂yi
∂x
− ∂gˆ
∂x
)
dG(ω)+(1−G(k)) 4Y4G
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where k =
´ ω¯
ω
I [(1− x)yi − g ≤ 0] dG(ω). Notice that for not so small 4G this
formula would be an aproximation because we are not considering individuals
that switch from being a net tax payer to a net grant receiver (or viceversa) as
a consequence of the change in policy. Notice anyway that as the change in 4G
becomes arbitrarily small the set of this kind of voters reduces to individuals
with (1− x)yi − g = 0 (if any of them exists) and the formula becomes exactly
correct. This is the change in the size of the government induced by an increase
in the wage of the median voter. It is easy to realize that if g ≤ 0 given that
x ≤ 1 then (1− x)yi − g > 0 for all i, therefore
4S
4G =
4Y
4G ≥ 0
This is also linked with the progressivity of the tax system. Using a standard
index of progressivity described in section 6:
PR(x, g,G(ω)) ≡ EG
[
g
y2i
]
= gσ(x, Y,G(ω))
4S
4G =
ωˆ¯
ω
I
[
(1− x)yi − PR/σ(x, Y,G(ω)) ≤ 0
] 4x
4G
(
yi − (1− x)∂yi
∂x
− ∂gˆ
∂x
)
dG(ω)+
+ (1−G(k)) 4Y4G
Because S(x, Y,G(ω)) is continuous in PR and 4S4G ≥ 0 for PR ≤ 0 , then
there exists a threshold J(x, Y.G(ω)) such that if at the equilibrium PR ≤
J(x, Y.G(ω)), then 4S4G ≥ 0, which proves part (ii).
The result states that if the tax system exhibits sufficiently low levels of pro-
gressivity (or it is regressive), then the size of the government is nondecreasing
in ym In the same way one can prove that the result holds also if the size of the
government is defined as the total tax revenues TR(x, Y,G(ω)) or the average
tax rate AT (x, Y,G(ω)) as defined in the previous section. Q.E.D.
AppendixC.3. Example
Proof. Consider the following example: there is a continuum of voters of Lebesgue
measure 1, individuals have wages ωi ∈ [1, ω¯] with E(ω) = µ and cdf G(ω). Pef-
erences are represented by the utility function:
u(ci, Y, li) = α ln(ci) + (1− α) ln(Y ) + γli
Say the policy space is (x, Y ) with x ∈ [x, 1] and Y ∈ [0, Y ] with x, Y¯ chosen
such that x ≥ γY¯αµ > 0. Solve for the optimal labor supply conditional on the
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policy (x, Y ) (notice that the assumptions about x, Y and ωi imply an internal
solution in T is large enough):
h∗i (x, Y ) =
α
γ
− (1− x)y¯
xωi
+
Y
xωi
This implies:
y¯(x, Y ) =
αxµ
γ
+ Y
Substitute h∗i (x, Y ) and y¯(x, Y ) into Vi to get:
Vi = α ln (αxωi)− α ln (γ) + (1− α) ln (Y )− α+ (1− x)αµ
ωi
− γY
ωi
Vx =
α
x
− γµ
ωi
VY =
1− α
Y
− γ
nωi
Vxωi =
γµ
ω2i
> 0
VY ωi =
γ
nω
> 0
VxY = 0
Hence SM and SSCP hold for (x, Y ) and ωi for all i and all (x, Y ) ∈ X. Notice
that the indirect utility function is strictly concave in x, Y if the is:
x∗i = x if low corner
x∗i =
α
γ
ωi
µ , if interior
x∗i = 1 if high corner
Y ∗i = max
[
(1− α)ωi
γ
, Y
]
confirming the expected result of the optimum being monotonic nondecreasing
in ωi. Now recall that
g = (1− x)y¯ − Y
in this example for Y < Y this is equivalent to:
g = αωmγ2
(
α− α2ωmγµ − (1−α)ωmµ
)
if x < x < 1
g = (αµ− (1− α)ωm)x/γ if x = x
g = − (1−α)ωiγ if x = 1
Notice that g ≤ 0 if x = 1 or if x < 1and ωmµ ≥ αγα2+γ(1−α) , but interior solutions
occur only if ωmµ <
γ
α . This implies that for
γ
α >
ωm
µ ≥ αγα2+γ(1−α) there is an
interior solution with g ≤ 0. Moreover we have internal solutions with g > 0
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for γα >
ωm
µ ≥ αγ2[α2+γ(1−α)] which is the thresholt that guarantees that the
total tax revenue does not exceed the total income. Also one can prove that
µ ≥ αα2−γ(1−α) and a suitable choice of Y is sufficient to ensure that the objective
function isωi − concave for all i. Finally notice that for interior solutions:
∂g
∂ωm
=
α
γ2
(
α− 2α
2
γµ
− 2(1− α)
µ
)
< 0
in all the range of parmeters for which the solution is interior. Q.E.D.
AppendixD. Lemma 20
In the augmented MR model, the progressivity of the tax system is weakly
decreasing in the in the median income (at constant mean income).
Proof. Recall the definitions of progressivity as the expectation of the Slitor
index:
PR = EG
(
∂Ti
∂yi
∣∣∣∣
x,g
)
= EG
(
gˆ
y2i
)
The CS of interest is:
4PR
4G
∣∣∣∣
yi
=
∂PR
∂x
∣∣∣∣
yi
4x
4G =
= E
(
1
y2i
)
∂gˆ
∂x
4x
4G ≤ 0∀i
The sign of the above is weakly negative because ∂gˆ∂x < 0 at any equilibrium
point (x, Y ) with x < x¯ This is true because if not there exists another policy
(x′, Y ) Such that x′ > x and gˆ(x′, Y,G(ω)) ≥ gˆ(x, Y,G(ω)). Such policy is
preferred to (x, Y ) by all i hence (x, Y ) cannot be an equilibrium. on the other
hand if if x = x¯ it must be that 4x4G = 0; in both cases the above is weakly
negative. Alternatively one may want to keep into account of the changes in
earned income induced by the change in equilibrium policies:
4PR
4G =
∂PR
∂x
4x
4G +
∂PR
∂Y
4Y
4G =
= E
[
−2g
y3i
(
dy∗i
dx
4x
4G +
dyi
dY
4Y
4G
)
+
1
y2i
(
∂gˆ
∂x
4x
4G +
∂gˆ
∂Y
4Y
4G
)]
< 0∀i
Hence in this case a sufficient condition for the above to be negative for all i
is
dy∗i
dx ≥ 0 (or not strongly negative). Under assumptions A1,A2 this s alsways
satisfied as
dy∗i
dx = −dy
∗
i
dt > 0 by assumption A2. Q.E.D.
39
AppendixE. Lemma 21
Proof. Substitute the individual and the governmental budget constraint into
the utility function. The resulting objective function of citizen i is V (x, y, T ; θi) =
f(x, y) + u ((1− t)hiθi + ty¯ − x/n, 1− hi). First derivatives of V are: Vx =
fx − uc/n; Vt = −uc (hiθi − y¯). Second derivatives at constant y¯ (see definition
of Vij in Appendix B) are: Vtθi =
[
−ucc
(
hi + θi
∂hi
∂θi
)
(1− t) + ucl ∂hi∂θi
]
(yi − y¯)−
uc
(
hi + θi
∂hi
∂θi
)
< 0; Vxθi = −ucc
(
hi + θi
∂hi
∂θi
)
(1 − t) + ucl ∂hi∂θi > 0; Vxt =
ucc (yi − y¯) > 0. Notice that limyi→y¯ Vtθi = 0; limyi→y¯ Vxt = 0; limyi→y¯ Vtxθ >
0. Hence there must be a threshold yˆ(y¯) such that if yˆ(y¯) ≤ ym < y¯ then the
comparative statics is: (i) x is increasing in ym; (ii) g is decreasing in ym; (iii)
the comparative statics of t is ambiguous. This implies that a less progressive
tax system will be implemented and the amount of transfers to poor individu-
als will fall and at the same time the expenditure in national defence will rise.
Moreover, using Theorem 18 we know that the expenditure in defence of all
other countries must be weakly higher in equilibrium.
———————
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